

### LECTURE III.

Origin of the federative principle.—Local government and administrative centralization in Portuguese and Spanish America: their different aspects.—Lack of uniformity in colonial legislation.—Viceroys and *Audiencias*.—Union through confederation in the three Americas.—Schemes of American royalties: Aranda, Pitt and Chateaubriand.—The monarchical idea in Latin America and its moral effect.—The first Monroe Doctrine.—Franco-British rivalries in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.—Napoleon and the British interests in the New World.—Monarchical possibilities in Buenos Aires, Mexico, and Colombia.—Pitiable rôle of Ferdinand VII.—Iturbide, Bolivar, and San Martin.—European or creole dynasties.—Historical function of the Brazilian Empire.—The moderate minds in the colonies and liberal ideas in Spain.—Precedents for the idea of separation.—The traditional discontent, the genesis of the patriotic instinct, and the personal tie between the sovereign and his possessions in America.

WE have now to examine the precedents for federation, to discover the genesis of the idea of particularism, to search for the earliest traditions of local government, whether established under the influence of the metropolis, or due to the spontaneous action of the elements transplanted from Europe to a different environment.

Of the two Iberian kingdoms Portugal alone, with the design of a speedier occupation and a surer defense of the new dominion beyond the sea, restored, in Brazil, the old and already abolished feudal system. The South American colony was divided into feudal captaincies, and distributed, in the first half of the sixteenth century, among a few lords of the court and some high officials, to whom as donataries the king granted the most extensive powers, reserving only for himself the rights of suzerain; for instance, the supreme bestowal of justice in certain cases, and the collection of taxes.

Though the inefficiency of such a constitutional system was soon recognized and its anachronism was patent, the fundamental principle remained more or less operative during the colonial epoch; it did not even disappear after the establishment of Independence and continues to act as a political pendulum. It was true that the centralization attempted in the colony a short time after that essay of territorial partition, was so to speak illusory, although Spain strengthened it at the time of her union with Portugal.

During this union of the Iberian kingdoms the Spanish government, always in favor of a policy of centralization, dared to deprive the local chiefs—the governors we may say, as in 1580 there were almost no donataries left in Brazil—of their judicial attributes. Centralization continued however to prove illusory, because the captain-generals were in fact independent of the governor-general, who was invested later on with the title of viceroy.

The German professor Handelmann [1], who keeps his place as our best foreign historian—less dramatic and attractive than Southey [2], but never surpassed in interesting documentation and philosophical insight—admirably pointed out this characteristic of Brazilian evolution. Besides, the unifying work of Spain, followed out as it was in a more vigorous and effective way, was abruptly checked by the Dutch war, which caused Portugal the temporary loss of the enormous territory from the São Francisco river up to the Amazon, one-half, perhaps, of the Brazils then explored. After the reestablishment of Portuguese authority and the recovery of the whole of her American colonies, the Lisbon government did not continue the centralizing policy pursued by Spain, either through lack of energy, or owing to doubt as to the efficacy of the Spanish system. Each captaincy remained an administrative unit, directly and individually subject to the orders of the metropolis, without any intervention from the royal representative, although his nominal power extended over the whole of the possessions of the New World. Each of these captaincies lived its own life, more or less as independent of its neighbors, very much as did the English colonies of North America.<sup>1</sup>

Portugal was so much more in a position to restore feudalism in America and then to create amongst her possessions an organic particularism, owing to the fact that she had rapidly attained a remarkable degree of political and social cohesion. In the mother country the provinces were mere administrative divisions, only differentiated by the picturesque costumes of the people. This result had immediately followed the conquest of the land over the Moors and the superposition of the King, helped by the commons, over the nobility which in other countries had been so much opposed to the work of national unification.

In Spain the process of national growth was somewhat different. Her

<sup>1</sup> This point is admirably discussed by M. Charles de Lannoy, a professor in the University of Ghent, in p. 94 of the work written in collaboration with M. Herman Vander Linden entitled "Histoire de l'Expansion coloniale des Peuples européens." (Bruxelles, 1907.) The first section of this work deals with the colonies of Portugal, the latter with those of Spain.

territorial integration took place but late<sup>2</sup>—on the eve, we may say, of her maritime expansion—and even so it proved incomplete and precarious, as such unification consisted chiefly in the union of two royal houses, the Castilian and the Aragonese. Each group of states maintained their peculiar institutions within their respective boundaries, and their inhabitants, as well, preserved marked differences of character and civilization—differences which may also be accounted for in part by the disparity of geographical conditions. This is why federalism in Spain today is so logical and legitimate an expression of public aspirations, and why Pi y Margall's book [3] became the Gospel of those who, in his country or elsewhere, think decentralization to be, especially when resting on traditions, the ideal form of government.

This typically Spanish ideal of government was not without influence on the organization of Brazil during the union of Spain and Portugal. For instance, the system of vice-royalties with captaincies gravitating about them found a counterpart in the division of Brazil into two or three great states in opposition to the more plainly centralizing tendency in the Lisbon government.<sup>3</sup>

This theoretical centralization in Brazil did not affect, as we have seen, the extreme particularism which in practice served as a counterpoise or a corrective, exactly as, in matters of legislation, the lack of laws and general rules forming a definite plan of administration, was supplied by a multitude of special decrees and royal orders, which together formed the colonial *corpus juris*. We find on the subject in the work of the Belgian scholars, Lannoy and Van der Linden, a very happy passage based on the writings of an exceedingly able Portuguese author of administrative law, Coelho da Rocha [4]. This passage finds, moreover, a remote but not less valuable confirmation through the testimony of a book contemporaneous with the most brilliant period of Portuguese colonial expansion. This book is called *The Practical Soldier*, and is the work of Diego do Conto, the historian [5]. The Belgian author's page is the following:

"The institutions in the Portuguese colonies were mostly copied from those of the metropolis, without being, however, adapted to their new destination. Administrative organization never proceeded according to a uniform plan: it was determined by the march of events. The duties of

<sup>2</sup> This fact is clearly brought out by H. Van der Linden, *op. cit.* p. 253 *et seq.*

<sup>3</sup> It was only later on that Portugal saw fit to sever Para-Maranhão from Brazil proper, and in this case a number of special reasons were operative, *e. g.*, the vastness of the dominion conquered, the distance of these regions from the seat of the central authority, and finally the difficulties of navigation along the northern coast in a southern direction.

the many officials, their hierarchy and relations of service, were not stipulated by laws or general rules, but by a mass of special decrees, some appointing functionaries for the places, others dealing with the solution of a transitory difficulty or the suppression of some abuse. Often the adjustment of the different pieces of the administrative machinery worked of itself, as a result of habit or routine, sometimes in accordance with the designs of the central government, other times against them.

"If the Portuguese Kings since the reign of John II (1481-95) had their lawyers who gave to the laws of the Kingdom the interpretation most suitable to the interests of the crown, the colonial governors also had their own legal authorities, who furnished the texts with the meaning most favorable to the power of the chiefs who respectively employed them. It certainly is not an easy task to describe this administrative machinery, even when one knows the text of the laws and decrees which have organized it, which is not always the case; but it is still more difficult to explain their real working. It is frequently impossible to distinguish with certainty the laws that were applied from those which were not applied, or which were not applied as they ought to have been, and it is not without difficulty that we are enabled to define with precision the duties of the several authorities" [6].

These comments remind me of what was already said of us Ibero-Latin people, that we were in need of but one law—one which should put into execution all the existing ones. Such opinion appears naturally exaggerated in its gratuitous generalization, but if it be true that the application amongst us has not always corresponded to the intention; I mean, if often the ideal was not exactly followed in practice, we must bear in mind that the continuous effort towards a same direction finally reaches the end and accomplishes the *desideratum* as it was formulated. This is just the spectacle which Spanish-Portuguese America is affording, with her eyes turned towards a high and conspicuous mission in the history of mankind.

In such an earnest desire Latin America is helped by tradition, and you have already seen how much tradition is contained in our past. Confining ourselves, however, to the special subject of today's lecture, we must own that Spain was more coherent than Portugal in her constitutional orientation, for while she had her immense colonial empire divided into several administrative groups, separated and isolated, she allowed the tree of municipal freedom to grow and receive better care. On the contrary, in the Portuguese possessions, especially in Brazil, such liberties were occasionally assailed and destroyed.

This greater predilection for municipal freedom was but natural in

the classic land of the *fueros*, although, as we have seen, when the municipal institution—an atavic expression of the Roman moral inheritance, peculiar to Iberian political life in the period immediately following the Christian reconquest of the Peninsula—was transported to the New World, the kingdoms organized in the Old World were already undergoing the crisis of centralization which was to go on increasing up to the storm of the French Revolution.

As a result, nevertheless, of colonial conditions, chief among which was that of distance from the metropolis, a system of checks and balances had to be formed, the key of which was represented by the division of powers, as was the case long afterwards with your wise constitution. So, the Spanish viceroys, direct and not always scrupulous representatives of the royal power—I do not mean that some of those viceroys did not greatly distinguish themselves by their spirit of equity and progress—could see standing before their thrones, as a counterpoise to their authority, the royal *audiencias* [7]. These august bodies joined to their judicial attributions a political character, since they exercised a supervision over the behavior of the Executive. Hence these courts assumed in a certain way the rôle normally played by the legislative branch of the government in those societies possessing self-government. Or looked at from another standpoint the *audiencias* contained in germ the function of the supreme court as it exists in your own country.

The tree, once transplanted, spread its roots in the soil of the three Americas. I do not refer to North, Central, and South America, but to English, Spanish, and Portuguese America. Federative union was the capital work of your first statesmen. The Brazilian Empire also sketched it, after having, by an effort of centralization, contrary to historical traditions, saved the political unity of a country homogeneous through its race and its culture. It was finally a federative union that the city of Caracas proposed to the other Colombian towns when it proclaimed its municipal autonomy in 1810, a year before the declaration of the independence of the country.

Such union, converted into a great American confederation, was the solution pointed out since 1790 by the precursor Miranda and reiterated in 1809 by the *Cabildos* of Buenos Ayres and Caracas as the best way to oppose Napoleon's policy of universal absorption. You well know that the execution of such a policy in the Iberian Peninsula gave the signal for the Spanish-American rebellion and was the starting point of the movement for the organization of the neo-Spanish nationalities of the New World.

We find a last trace of the Spanish administrative system by groups in de Aranda's [8] famous plan, the farthest-reaching one that was ever conceived by an European statesman regarding transatlantic colonies. According to this plan, which anticipated and surpassed modern British conception on relations between metropolis and colonies, Cuba, Porto-Rico, and a portion of South America to be determined later, were to remain under the immediate rule of the Spanish crown as possessions enjoying a limited autonomy, something like Jamaica or Guiana of today. All of the remaining Spanish-American colonies were to be divided into three large kingdoms or dominions—New Spain (Mexico), Terrafirma (New Granada), and Peru, which were to be granted to Spanish Infantes. The independence of these new kingdoms was to be conditioned only by the recognition of the Spanish King or Emperor, as suzerain, and the promise on the part of the Infantes to wed in the future only Spanish princesses.

The elder Pitt conceived a somewhat similar plan, when, in 1762, he was led to realize, on your refusal to join the British efforts in the war against France, that the hour for the emancipation of the English colonies in America was close at hand. In order to avoid a complete separation the great statesman conceived a sort of trans-Atlantic confederation. Canada, then conquered, would form the apanage of an English prince as an independent monarchy, while the remaining British possessions would be transformed into kingdoms, parts of a great Anglo-American league.

The motives which led Count de Aranda to advance his famous proposal of 1783 are well known. He desired to solve permanently the problem of the future relations between a metropolis which was losing in authority, and colonies which were gaining in strength, because he foresaw the puissance of your country, and desired to protect Spanish America from an absorption that seemed to him otherwise unavoidable. You will recall that this project was launched just at the conclusion of your Revolutionary War, in which France and Spain had been your allies against England. It is significant that on this occasion the minister of Charles III prophesied that Florida—just recovered to Spain from England—as well as New Spain or Mexico, would eventually be annexed by the United States.

The Spanish statesman was convinced that the United States would in the end dominate the great American empire at their door and he used to say that it would become impossible for Spain to avoid such an eventuality, as she could not think of opposing a powerful nation established on the same continent. We may say he guessed the Monroe Doctrine in its

second meaning at least, as in the first it did not include any alliance with Latin American possessions revolted against their metropolis. Thus, Jefferson, when living in France as minister, in 1787, dampened the juvenile enthusiasm of the Brazilian student Maia, who, speaking on behalf of some vague, faraway conspirators, insisted on some help from the United States in favor of the liberty of his fatherland; and Monroe, as Secretary of State, pointed out that the obligations of neutrality would not permit any interference in the struggle between Spain and her revolted colonies [9].

Such, however, was not the attitude of France. Napoleon not only evinced an active interest in the political emancipation of Spanish America but even decided to lend active support to the revolutionists. And it was only the fall of the Empire, the agony of which began precisely in 1812 with the failure of the Russian campaign, which prevented a French contingent from associating with the Colombian troops in the Wars of Independence. It would have been a curious sight, that of English and French soldiers fighting under the same flag in the New World—the part taken by the British Legion in the decisive Battle of Carabobo [10] is well known—when in Europe both countries were such bitter foes.

Like Napoleon's intervention in the Spanish American Wars of Independence, the American monarchies fancied by Aranda never passed beyond the stage of a mere project. And yet it cannot be gainsaid that the establishment of these trans-Atlantic kingdoms, with their promise of peace and stability, was sincerely desired by not a few of those who subsequently became partisans of complete independence. That the timely foundation of such monarchies would have spared the former colonies of Spain much disorder and anarchy may be inferred from a study of the political evolution of Portuguese America. Imperial Brazil was indeed a model of order with progress, as soon as the country adjusted itself to the political mould which the federalist democrats had accepted as a temporary resource, and tried to destroy immediately after the separation from the mother country—an enterprise in which they were in the end unsuccessful [11].

The indirect influence of the United States upon the growing nationalities of Latin America clearly appears at this point. If the only existing autonomous government in the New World has assumed a republican form, corresponding to the model preached by ethnologists and doctrinaires and by the exalted partisans of action, it was but natural to see its example followed by the other nations of the continent, once the colonial dependence became a thing of the past. Brazil was not then in a position to exert a contrary influence. Her civil pacification was far from being a reality, and the beginning of the Empire was but the transfer of the

seat of a monarchy from an European Kingdom to an American possession, in consequence of a number of very special circumstances. Yet the monarchical idea, reënforced and strengthened by its realization in Brazil—the best argument in favor of our Empire was the preservation intact of its imposing territorial extension—exerted a larger influence than is generally believed. A forerunner in a new and attractive field of historical investigation, the Venezuelan scholar Señor Carlos Villanueva, has recently published in Paris, on the subject of monarchical influence in America, a series of interesting books based on diplomatic papers found in European archives. The first two have respectively the titles of "Bolívar and San Martín" and "Ferdinand VII and the new States," and they are both published under the general title of "Monarchy in America" [12].

The subject is a vast one even when we consider only the period of the Wars of Independence with its spontaneous attempts to establish royalties in the New World. Such a survey would of course exclude the well known episode of Maximilian's empire, an event which must be considered rather as the result of a foreign imposition, or at least an attempt to apply to conditions in America a purely European political expedient. We may, however, be sure that Napoleon III would never have conceived the design of the empire of 1864, if he had not listened to the entreaties of the conservative and clerical elements in Mexico, alarmed at the bloody and sordid anarchy which masqueraded under the name of a republic.

The influence which the monarchical idea exerted in Spanish America in the second decade of the nineteenth century is seen in the anomalous situation which had developed in what is now the Argentine Republic. The Buenos Aires revolutionists, even the members of the Tucumán Congress had already considered the monarchical solution at the best calculated to spare the country the indiscipline of passions and the horrors of civil war. If a Spanish Infante, if Doña Carlota Joaquina, Princess Regent living then in Rio de Janeiro, had appeared at the Rio de la Plata, an acclamation would have been the immediate consequence and a delirium of enthusiasm would have followed.

In Venezuela, the other Spanish-American focus of irradiation of the feeling of Independence, aristocratic ideas prevailed against the monarchical ones, not because the republican form of government constituted the definite aspiration of an ignorant population, or even the ideal of the majority of the assembly which represented colonial intellectuality, but—simply because there was nobody to whom the crown might be offered.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup>This idea is admirably brought out by Señor Villanueva in his work *La Monarquía en América*, t. II, primera parte, *passim*.

As candidates for Spanish American thrones, Spanish Infantes counted indeed in their behalf considerations of race, customs, religion and affinities. Their political opportunity, however, had vanished, and such happy and logical conclusion of the political crises opened for the Spanish New World had ceased to be possible since a Bonaparte had taken the place of the legitimate sovereign on the throne of the metropolis. Such usurpation had shaken to its foundations the prestige of the royal Castilian house in the eyes of populations whose dynastic loyalty partook very much of the nature of hothouse plants.

There were even to be found monarchical enthusiasts who later broached the chimerical project of placing this same Joseph Bonaparte, the ex-king of Spain, at the head of a Mexican monarchy similar to that of Iturbide, or even ruler over a kingdom embracing the Rio de la Plata region. Obviously nothing could come of such fantastic plans. To understand how they could ever have been entertained we must bear in mind that, after Napoleon's fall, Joseph Bonaparte had come to live in the United States as a private citizen under the name of Count de Survilliers. The above-mentioned Venezuelan historian refers to such projects, which were a result of Bonapartist dreams, having as sole basis of reality the evasion of Napoleon from St. Helena. All these plans were foredoomed to failure, since England was mistress of the seas, and had therefore their execution at her mercy. England was even opposed to any scheme looking to the foundation of national, I mean, traditional dynasties in the old Spanish colonies, and the restoration of the Bourbons did not alter her views on the matter, as she was more pleased to deal with republics watched by her cabinets and protected by her fleets, than with monarchies allied to royal houses in Europe. A single exception was made in the case of the House of Braganza, on account of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, a true protectorate of the stronger nation over the weaker one.

The British government of the time had established on her own behalf a kind of Monroe doctrine in reference to Latin America. England was the necessary intermediary between Portugal and Brazil and she was also the political godmother of the new Spanish-American republics. Mention of the Monroe Doctrine is the more suitable on this occasion as it was particularly inspired in Washington at that time by Canning—the same Canning whose ambition was the tutorship of a New World, which he so proudly proclaimed to have called to an international existence in order to reestablish the balance of the Old. His best justification was that, after Napoleon's fall and Europe's pacification, Independent America

had found in London her most valuable if not her only support against the Holy Alliance, formed with reactionary designs and hostile to the British liberal feeling.

It is an undeniable historical truth that the emancipation of Latin America was performed without any positive help from the United States: platonic sympathy or love is not, unfortunately, enough in such cases, and I even venture to say, in any case. On the contrary, England's support assumed a material shape: it was not precisely represented by troops—although some distinguished British officers, as Admiral Cochrane [13] and General Miller [14], were to be found in the revolutionary ranks, where no American commander was ever seen—but consisted in diplomatic, financial, and even military and naval facilities.

I am very well aware that the United States was not then the great power of our present time, and that she had just been again at war with her old metropolis, and could not but hesitate to defy absolutist Europe by extending tangible protection to Spanish America before reaching a diplomatic understanding with England. On the other side, I do not mean to say that the proceedings of the British government were dictated by reasons of pure social altruism, of mere international philanthropy—where would you find such principles flourishing in political environments?—but the truth is that things happened that way.

Rivalry between France and England fills up many centuries of modern European history—not to speak of the history of the Middle Ages—and British devotion to Spanish American rebels corresponds in a certain sense to one more feature of that rivalry. The war of Spanish Succession, provoked by the ascension of Louis XVIII's grandson to the throne wherefrom the shadow of the last king of the Austrian dynasty had vanished, has already been justly called by historical writers an economic war, and it is certain that, when associating her arms to Archduke Charles' fortune, England specially aimed at preventing the economic, much more than the political union of those two nations, divided until then by the Pyrenees, and now destined to be both ruled by princes of the Bourbon house.

The French colonial empire had not yet experienced the enormous losses of India, Canada, and Louisiana, and for England it was of vital moment to oppose naval French supremacy both in the Atlantic and the Pacific and above all in the Mediterranean—a supremacy which would be, even under an exclusive form, the sure sequel of an intimate alliance with Spain. Soon after, however, at the peace of Utrecht which followed the war of the Spanish Succession, Spain had to renounce her ambition

to be any longer a maritime power in the Mediterranean, as she was compelled to surrender to England Gibraltar and Minorca. France, however, continued under a spell of colonial prosperity, for she did not have to abandon Canada or India before 1763, and Louisiana, ceded to Spain in 1762, was again in the possession of France from 1800 to 1804.

The names of Lafayette and Rochambeau will recall to you the support France gave to your Independence in revenge for the mutilations she suffered in her over-sea possessions through the loss of Canada and India. And it is a well known fact that Napoleon did not alienate to Jefferson a large part of your present West before trying, in Egypt and Syria, on the Mississippi and in the Caribbean Sea, to rebuild the former French colonial empire, causing the hated British supremacy to bleed to death on the faraway oceans as well as on the continent of Europe. Trafalgar destroyed such hopes, but the British government stood nevertheless on her guard, and did not conceal her fear of the revival of her colonial rival, when a Napoleon took in Madrid, the place of the Bourbons.

So the support of England, indirect, if you wish, but nevertheless important, brought in such emergency to Spanish America, had a double aspect.<sup>5</sup> In so far as it was dictated by a fear of France this support was political in character, as it was designed to check the plans of Napoleon and anticipate possible French expansion in the New World. As regards Spain, the aid accorded the struggling colonies was due primarily to economic motives, or it was the desire of England to convert into legal traffic with the new states the smuggling which for a long time had taken place to the detriment of the old metropolis. It is significant that commerce even used to increase after each of the wars that both nations sustained during the eighteenth century and through which the power of the Spanish imperial mantle was gradually wearing out.

We must acknowledge that you did not have in the United States the same reasons as did England and France for granting us your help. Let us hasten to add that the new American States, on their part, did not neglect the economic opportunities suddenly opened to them as a result of the new relations with Europe created by the Wars of Independence. The distinguished Colombian author Perez Triana says in the last volume of the *Cambridge Modern History* that Latin America's official debt to Europe—I mean the loans guaranteed by the governments of the respective countries, amounts to five hundred millions sterling, and that the

<sup>5</sup> Portuguese America need not be considered in this connection, as Portugal was at this time under the complete control of England.

double of this sum must be reckoned for the capital invested in private affairs—mines, agricultural experiments, industries, shipping companies, banks and so forth.

Considering such an intimacy of interests between Latin America and England and the consequent harmony of views, it seems natural that a monarchical feeling, derived from British constitutionalism, might have permeated the first essays of autonomous organization of Latin America, in opposition to your republican suggestion. Its action was in fact perceptible, the more so as England had been a constant model for the partisans of monarchy. Yet this influence was neutralized by the efforts of a few leaders who had rather shown a decided taste for democracy. The minds of these republican enthusiasts were inspired by French philosophy and still more by all the events which since 1787 had been occurring in Europe with striking rapidity.

The same thing was, in fine, happening in the New World as in the Old: both here and there the two tendencies, the aristocratic and the democratic, the monarchical and the republican, stood face to face. Hence the same time that in Mexico the King of Spain himself was proclaimed Emperor and for want of an Infante who might be placed at the head of the autonomous Kingdom of New Spain, her government assumed the form of Iturbide's military and spurious monarchy, a similar constitutional crisis developed in the extreme South of the Southern continent.

The erection of a throne on the territory of La Plata engaged, after 1815, the best activity of Argentine diplomacy, as it has already been the greatest preoccupation of the men who in 1810 had undertaken the responsibilities of independent government. The romantic tendency went so far in this direction that it was seriously proposed to galvanize into life the theocratic despotism of the Incas, decked out in all the gala trappings of liberalism. Somebody even thought of harmonizing dynasties, nations, and races through the wedding of the last descendant of Atahualpa and Tupac Amaru to one of the Portuguese princesses, daughters of John VI and Queen Carlota Joaquina [15].

These picturesque absurdities, which already announced the Indianism [16] so characteristic of the next literary period should not blind us to the fact that this monarchical ideal had captivated some of the greatest minds of South America. San Martin himself, the glorious soldier who gave Chile her freedom and, in his desire to deprive Spain of her last South American redoubt, even penetrated into Peru, had been as early as 1812 a fervid partisan of a monarchical form of government for

the new states he had helped to bring into being. Moreover, Belgrano [17], Rivadavia [18], Pueyrredon [19], and all those who belonged to the Supreme Dictator's party fully shared San Martin's views, but owing to circumstances foreign to their wishes, their choice wavered amongst a whole gallery of princes, passing from the Duke of Orleans, the future King of the French, Louis Philippe, to the Duke of Lucca, an Italian Bourbon.

The name of the last candidate aroused an interest entirely disproportionate to his historic importance. Even the British Parliament was deeply agitated at rumors that this inconspicuous Italian princeling might secure a majority of the votes of those Argentine statesmen bent on importing a foreign monarch. Behind the Duke of Lucca the English descried the French Foreign Office, guided by Richelieu or Chateaubriand, developing such an intrigue in a sense favorable to French dynastic interests. At this juncture such interests were identical with those of Spain, and were coupled with political aims opposed to England [20]. Only the statesmen of the *Restoration* failed to appraise at their true value the stupidity and obstinacy of Ferdinand VII, one of the monarchs who have least deserved the title of king,—a ruler who would justify any republic. He it was indeed who, in his intellectual dullness, only rendered more evident by his innate perfidy, chiefly ignored the New World's events and showed himself most hostile to an agreement. Foreign diplomats, amongst whom figured the French plenipotentiary, describe him as indifferent to the loss of his absolutist rights.

A crisis had arrived in the reign of Ferdinand VII when a policy of shuffling and tergiversation was absolutely fatal. Events in the New World had been moving with kaleidoscopic rapidity. The victory of Carabobo had set Venezuela free; Cochrane and San Martin had reached Peru and begun her conquest, the Peruvian royalists having themselves called La Serna [21] to the palace of the viceroy Pezuela [22]; the viceroy of Mexico, Apodaca [23], had abdicated and his successor, O'Donoju [24] had felt himself compelled by a general rebellion to take refuge in Vera Cruz; the Mexican representatives to the Constitutional Cortes had made an eloquent appeal to Spanish liberals, pointing out how it was still possible to keep a good intelligence and even a certain union through the foundation of American monarchies. But the incapable sovereign, intent only on the preservation of his despotic power, refused to recognize the changed situation that had arisen in America. Any compromise in which his absolute rights might suffer a curtailment was repugnant to him and in his dilemma he thought only of imploring the intervention of the Holy

Alliance as a supreme measure of dynastic and public salvation, identifying both in a case where one was in no wise synonymous with the other. So unhappy an attitude gave to French royalty the opportunity of winning for the Duke de Angoulême's expedition the laurels of Trocadero [25], and to Chateaubriand the pretext for obtaining at Verona the right of intervention and for restoring by himself the plan of the Spanish American monarchies. The king of Spain was consequently the principal obstacle to the realization of those projects of a general importance for the New World, since even Bolívar himself, at a given moment, was ready to accept monarchy as the best solution for the crisis. It is to be noted however that the *Libertador* remained inflexible in his antagonism to Spanish princes and in his insistence that if thrones were to be erected in Spanish America they should be occupied only by natives.

Bolívar also evinced a lasting abhorrence to all these monarchs of a local color or taste, especially after the miserable Napoleonic parody given by Mexico through her general Iturbide, who with the help of clergy, nobility and people, imitated the 18th Brumaire and even improved on it—as it was the Mexican Congress that under the gun's pressure went so far as to vote the proclamation of the empire of Augustine I—carrying the parody up to the *Sacre* with all the ceremonial adopted at Notre Dame for the *Emperor* [26].

The simile ought to stop here, as this exotic court lacked in its pageant, to soften the contrast with public distress, the splendor of military conquest. Yet even the return from Elbe found its counterpart in Mexico. After the deposition and banishment of Iturbide by Santa Anna—an easy task as the emperor displayed faint hearted resistance—the poor ex-sovereign determined to overcome the results of his pusillanimity and inertia by a return from Europe to the New World. He was arrested on landing at Mexico, however, and shot three days later.

You will see that the spectacle was of a nature to kindle the republican sentiments of Bolívar to whom, like Caesar, the crown was thrice offered. As to San Martín, if he had not left the struggle in 1824, disgusted and grieved, that precedent would have confirmed in his mind the belief that only a constitutional monarchy, *with an European prince at its its head*, could spare the independent New World the flood of blood and infamy in which it nearly disappeared.

San Martín calculated the power of this tide of lawlessness and insubordination by the conspiracies which his officers themselves plotted against him, specially after the arrival in the capital of Peru, when the troops that had freed Chile plunged in those new pleasures of Capua, and lost the

best of their warlike nerve. And it was precisely the disappointment of not being able to persuade Bolívar to share his royalist conception—as the monarchical *feeling* was common to both—that chiefly induced San Martín to desert public life. In the famous interview of Guayaquil [27], in July 1822, the two systems—the monarchical and the oligarchic—met and collided. Bolívar's ambition, quite natural in a man full of imagination, of reserving for himself the glory of definitely liberating Peru and achieving the wars of Independence, dashed against the logical wish of San Martín's reflexive mind, not to forsake, until the end had come, a campaign which he had initiated. As it always happens in such cases, disinterestedness gave way to ambition—ambition for honors, let us say, not for personal gains, as these lower motives had not yet subdued the minds of the *Libertadores* of South American countries. Bolívar found the field too narrow for two South American glories, both of them seeking after the palms of immortality: Napoleon would have thought exactly the same way. San Martín did not want for an egotistical reason to delay the conclusion of a political enterprise which possessed a vital interest for a whole continent. So Washington would have acted.

This historical parallel suggests itself in such a way, it occurs so easily, that you will not be surprised to learn that it has often been made and often repeated. We shall soon present it once more as it explains in a certain way the evolution, apparently contradictory, of Spanish America. Meanwhile I have mentioned such a comparison because it facilitates the understanding of what happened in that famous interview at Guayaquil—an event which has proved to be an inexhaustible source for varied and oftentimes conflicting commentaries on the part of the historians of the period.

A document of a considerable value on the subject has even been recently published: no less than the dispatch addressed, on July 29th, 1822, by Bolívar's general secretary to the Secretary of State for the Foreign Affairs of Colombia [28]. In this dispatch it is said that San Martín insisted that an invitation be extended to some European prince and that Bolívar, though simulating indifference for the form of government of each State taken as a unit, opposed himself decidedly to the introduction of a heterogeneous element in the national mass (*sic*). Such indifference was however so much the less sincere as Bolívar's dream of federation, expressed during the interview, could only rest on similarity of constitutional systems. It would have been quite impossible to associate monarchies and republics at a time when their mutual antagonism

appears most clearly and the principles represented by both forms of government were violently arrayed against each other.

Yet it is conceivable that a democratic federation might have at its head an *imperator*. Republican Rome lasted nominally, as a political faction, on into Imperial Rome, in the same way as the French Revolution lasted on into the Napoleonic Empire. There was apparently no break in the continuity and besides, the essential thing was the stability of the system, much more than the European character of the dynasty, which could only have served to stimulate rivalries amongst the Old World's powers.

In fact, Colombia's minister plenipotentiary in London—let us give him this title by anticipation—had written to Bolivar in 1820, after a conversation with Lord Castlereagh, that Spanish-American independence would be acknowledged by all powers as soon as an hereditary executive power had been established, under any denomination whatever, in the new republics [29]. Europe wanted more than anything else the recognition of the nationalities which she had helped to establish; the monarchical idea represented, even more than a question of principle, a question of opportunism, as it always happens with every political question under its practical aspect.

The application of a remedy, considered the only one possible for healing the disorder in which the Spanish American republics had fallen in such a short period of life, could not therefore be regarded as unadvisable in this domain, and we must not then be surprised at the statement of such well informed historians as Señor Carlos A. Villanueva that "laying bare the mind, the heart, the intimate feelings of Bolívar, we will find that he always thought of a native monarchy, disguised or declared, under England's protectorate, as the exclusive way of assuring his work and saving his glory. He had never conceived"—such are the textual words of a writer who has deeply studied his subject—"a democratic republic, as he judged impossible its consolidation."

At the critical moment the great man's ambition lacked the requisite decision, or if you prefer, the impudence which would have led him to place on his own head, crowned with laurels, the royal diadem which had been offered to him and which he had sought for, perhaps only to allow himself the impressive gesture of refusal after some grandiloquent phrases about liberty. Perhaps in the consummation of such a plan he was checked by what I may call doctrinaire remorse. If for such reason his memory became dearer to the republican moralist, his work decreased in the eyes of mankind.

Great Colombia was shattered into fragments in the pursuit of that mirage of democratic solidarity. Her leaders forgot that the foundation of one or more Spanish-American monarchies, similar to ours, to which Brazil was indebted, first for her union, and then for her pacification, would have spared the Christian civilization of the nineteenth century many bloody and grotesque pages. If my own country can boast of her history during the last century, if she can relate it to other countries with some pride, she owes it above all to the liberal influence of imperial institutions. Historical truth must not be immolated to prejudices, even if such prejudices be democratic or derive their sanction from foreign suggestion.

Indeed it is enough to read letters and memoirs of the Era of the Wars of Independence to be convinced that the ideas of unlimited equality and liberty did not find unanimous approval in colonial circles. There was, in fact, a large proportion of minds that might be called moderate. This condition of affairs need evoke no surprise when we recall that there was a certain proportion of the partisans of Independence who were either self-educated or had derived their liberal ideas from Spanish sources. Among these men the horrors of the French Revolution could not but excite a repulsion and feelings of revolt, for the influence to which they had been subjected emanated, as was just suggested, from Spain rather than from France, although a reflection could never stand in competition with the original shining light of French intellectuality.

Spanish ideas displayed during the eighteenth century some visible tendency towards political and social reforms. I have already mentioned the progressive ideas of Charles III, and it may not be amiss to remind you that the most remarkable men of Spanish-American Independence—Miranda, San Martín, Bolívar, O'Higgins [30], Belgrano—lived all of them more or less in Spain. There they came in touch with those liberal aspirations with which the educated minds of the Peninsula were permeated. And these same aspirations were carried back to America by the colonists, in germ, so to speak. Here under more favorable conditions they not only gave theoretical and superior expression to local discontent but with further development directly paved the way for emancipation.

Hence emancipation was not a spontaneous or sudden revelation: it had its causes, its precedents, in a word its traditions. Spanish historians wisely establish a distinction between rebellions of protest against acts or measures of governors or Companies—mutinies without a pre-

conceived plan, true *straw fires*,<sup>o</sup> as they are called in Portuguese and in French—and revolts guided or inspired by the idea of autonomy. These scholars find this second kind of revolt in several risings of the eighteenth century in Peru, Chile and Venezuela, even in insurrections of Indians, negroes and mulattoes [31].

Those historians, amongst whom I will mention Professor Rafael Altamira [32], do not also conceal that in official papers, such as the reports of viceroys and others, there are to be discovered sure and unsuspected evidence of the discontent existing among the cultivated natives due to the reason already pointed out—that the Spaniards from the metropolis enjoyed, so to speak, all official positions. The *Visitador* of New Spain, Galvez,—“visitador” was the name given to the royal commissioner charged of an inquiry into the administration of a certain viceroy or captain-general, about whom complaints happened to be presented to the sovereign—wrote in 1761 that the natives, I mean the *criollos*, had condensed their grievances into a set formula: “Spaniards not only don’t allow us to share the government of our country, but they carry away all our money” [33]. Mexicans even requested Charles III to grant them admission to public functions.

If at that time there did not yet exist in the colonies that definite patriotic feeling so conspicuous after the Wars of Liberation, there were not wanting evidences of what we might term a local patriotism. In fact this sentiment was so strong that it was the support given by England to the revolutionary attempt of Miranda in 1806 that chiefly contributed to the indifference shown by the dominating local class in Venezuela regarding such ill-fated separatist movements. In reality, however, the apprehensions of the Venezuelans were groundless. In supporting Miranda, England was intent only in aiding the colonies to sever their relations with the metropolis. In other words she was not seeking territorial aggrandizement as was the case with the British expedition against Buenos Aires in that same year, 1806 [34].

Such exclusivism is thoroughly characteristic of the Spanish national feeling: amongst you, on the contrary, French help was welcome, as if cosmopolitanism began even then to foretell its own advent. It is true that you could not harbor fears of foreign supremacy, and that any help of that kind contained a sure guarantee of success of a noble enterprise, already fully launched. For your own Revolution, long before the proffer of French or Spanish aid, was already the direct expression of a

<sup>o</sup> Or, “feux de paille,” “fogo de palha.”

national conscience, or, to be more strictly historical, of a union of collective consciences, from States that had reached the age of emancipation.

In Latin America this spiritual evolution synchronized with, and in a large measure resulted from, the political crisis engendered in Europe. Yet it would be an error to minimize the influence of events which occurred in South America on the eve of political emancipation. For instance the defeat of the English and consequent reconquest of Buenos Aires by the city militia, which until then only served as a theme of mockery for the European Spaniards established in the colonies, had a repercussion throughout the colonial empire. Such events inspired courage in the local population deserted by their viceroy and so led to victory by Liniers' [35] daring mind, with the self-confidence which had so far been strange to them. Liniers practically proved—and his demonstration could not but produce extraordinary effects—that the armed population was capable of defending itself against any foe, domestic or foreign, even though this foe might dispose of every means for the success of his attempt.

In this current of local patriotism, whose existence had been hardly suspected, was merged another current of a more truly national character, determined by the struggle which the mother country was sustaining against French dominion. The result was that latent colonial aspirations, apparently discordant, but alike in essence, emerged, so to speak, to the surface of national consciousness. Thus old atavistic instincts, stimulated by the Bourbon abdication—for it was generally denied to the King the right of disposing in that way of the fidelity of his American subjects—came to combine with feelings of personal loyalty to this same unfortunate monarch, violently deprived of his crown. The party of independence chiefly displayed its ability in disassociating itself from the Cadiz Regency [36] through the declaration of a direct dependency from the crown, that is, the strictly personal tie which bound colonies to their sovereign. On this basis, identical in all sections of Spanish America, the various colonies without any concerted action set out to secure a complete autonomy. Such autonomy was tantamount to separation from Spain, for when the first colonial risings occurred, the belief was general that Ferdinand VII would never again occupy his throne. On the strength of the doctrine proclaimed by the colonists and consecrated by several jurists, the colonial empire refused to acknowledge the authority of the boards or "Juntas" which called themselves delegations of the Spanish nation: the suzerainty of the nation, as such, was by right null and void over America, which was an exclusive apauage of the monarch, and not a national p