CHAPTER VI

BOGOTÁ AND THE TWO SIEGES OF CARTAGENA—FALL OF NEW GRANADA, 1815-16

BOLIVAR and Mariño, without touching anywhere on the way, landed at Cartagena on the 25th September 1814. Castillo, the bitter enemy of the former, was soon busy representing that to Bolivar alone was due the loss of Venezuela to the republican cause. The Liberator's justification of his own conduct is contained in a manifesto of the 30th September, which has already been referred to.[1]

Bolivar very soon left Cartagena to go up the Magdalena and, viâ Ocaña, to Tunja, where the Congress of New Granada was in session. When he got to Ocaña he heard of the presence at Cúcuta of Urdaneta, and that his Venezuelan troops were quarrelling with the Granadians. Turning aside to stop this friction, he heard at Salazar that the story was exaggerated, and, therefore, continued his journey to Tunja. Urdaneta had been at Barquisemeto when the news of La Puerta and the other disasters reached him. Entirely cut off by the intervening Spaniards from Bolivar and the east, having only three Venezuelan battalions and a squadron of cavalry, and recognising that the republic had for the time being collapsed, Urdaneta decided to fall back on New Granada. Arriving at Trujillo, he reported his situation to the Congress at Tunja. In reply, he was taken under

[1] *Vide supra*, p. 141.

the protection of New Granada, and directed to march to Tunja. Bolivar joined him at Pamplona, and was cheered by an enthusiastic reception by officers and men alike, notwithstanding that he had reproached the force with its indiscipline and insubordination.

On arrival at Tunja, Bolivar was cordially received by Camilo Torres, then President of the Congress. He insisted on appearing at the bar of the Congress to submit an explanation of his proceedings. The assembly was pleased to express loudly its approval, and Bolivar was at once commissioned to reduce to order Santa Fé (Bogotá),[1] which had separated itself from the Union and set up as an independent State, under the Dictatorship of M. B. Alvarez.[2]

Marching from Tunja, Bolivar arrived before Bogotá with 1800 men. In the city were Alvarez the Dictator and J. R. Leiva, a Spanish general in the service of the recalcitrant State. They had called in the aid of the Spaniards, and were supported by the influence of the clergy. The archbishop went so far as to excommunicate Bolivar as an enemy of religion.

That general was, on the 8th December 1814, camped at the farm of Techo, some four miles from Bogotá. Thence he wrote to Alvarez that he (Bolivar) was destined to be the Liberator, not the conqueror, of oppressed peoples. He desired union, and demanded the surrender of Alvarez and his State to the government of Tunja. He promised security of life and property, but Alvarez refused to yield.

[1] Santa Fé, as the name of the present capital of Colombia, was finally abandoned under article 5 of the fundamental law, passed on the 17th December 1819. Henceforward we shall always speak of the city by its modern name, Bogotá.

[2] Manuel Bernardo Alvarez, born in Bogotá in 1750, was a member of the Cabildo at the outbreak of the revolution in 1810. He was an opponent of Nariño, after whose capture in Pasto he became Dictator of Cundinamarca. He was shot at Bogotá in September 1816 by Morillo.

Bolivar, reconnoitring the city, was fired upon by artillery. He at once brought up his forces and commenced the attack of the city, which was not walled. On the third day of street fighting, Alvarez found himself driven back to the great square, and very short of water. He begged for an armistice, and negotiations were at once commenced for a capitulation. On the 12th December 1814, Alvarez surrendered the city to the national government. The news was received with delight at Tunja, and Bolivar was appointed Captain-General of the forces of the Confederation. The loss in the fighting had not been great, some 300 men on Alvarez's side, and less on Bolivar's. Having settled affairs in Bogotá, Bolivar returned to Tunja to arrange plans with the government for further operations. His proposal, which was accepted, was for an attack on the Spaniards at Santa Marta, on the north coast, which they still held in force. Thence a fresh advance eastwards could be organised against Rio Hacha, and later, against the Maracaibo province of Venezuela. Bolivar was clearly aiming at a repetition of his exploits of 1813. He had already indicated his views in his farewell to Venezuela at Carúpano.[1] In the meanwhile, Urdaneta was to be sent to Cúcuta with a division, to pacify that neighbourhood, and to be ready to support the advance against north-western Venezuela. Yet another detachment was sent southwards across the upper Magdalena, to Popayan in the upper valley of the Cauca, which was threatened by royalist attacks from the Quito direction. This expedition, which would have to cross the high passes of the Central Cordilleras, was commanded by Serviez[2] and Montúfar.

[1] *Supra*, p. 143.

[2] Manuel de Serviez, a Frenchman, after serving in the British and Russian armies, went to New Granada, where he played a part in Nariño's civil war in 1813. In 1816 he served in Casanare and under Paez. He was murdered in that year by robbers for the sake of $6000 which he had.

Having arranged all this, Bolivar returned once more to Bogotá, which he reached on the 1st January 1815, to prepare his column for the march on Santa Marta. On the same date Congress decided to transfer itself from Tunja to Bogotá, and adjourn till the 23rd for that purpose. On the 13th, the President, the members of the Congress, and the chief officials were received in state outside Bogotá by Bolivar, the Archbishop, the Cabildo, and others. Bolivar made a long speech, and was followed by others. The Representative Body of Cundinamarca did not separate till it had decreed to Bolivar the title of "Illustrious and Religious Pacificator." The second adjective was perhaps meant as an apology for his recent excommunication.

For the expedition against Santa Marta, the only stronghold of the royalists now remaining on the Atlantic coast of New Granada, Bolivar had 2000 men, amongst whom was only one squadron of cavalry. Arms and ammunition are said to have been deficient, though it might be thought that enough would have been found in Bogotá.

Castillo, whom Bolivar knew to be intriguing against him at Cartagena, was still a thorn in his side. In order to get rid of this enemy from the scene of operations, Bolivar proposed to appoint him to a seat on the Supreme Council of War at Bogotá, where he would be out of the way, and deprived of the local influence which he enjoyed at Cartagena. This being agreed to, Bolivar marched from Bogotá, on the 24th January 1815, for Honda, the town on the Magdalena where the upper and lower rivers are separated by a mile of rapids.[1] All

[1] During this march a shocking act of barbarity was committed by one of Bolivar's subordinates. Eleven unfortunate Spaniards, under sentence of banishment, were murdered on the plea that they were worn out and could not keep up. (O'Leary, i. p. 249.) There is nothing said of Bolivar's having inflicted any punishment for this atrocious act. He can hardly escape blame, at least as an accomplice after the fact.

these marches sound very little; for the distance from Bogotá to Honda is little over 100 miles; but it must be remembered that the road, even at the present day, is of a character almost inconceivable to Europeans who have not left their own continent. A single traveller on a mule can get down from the plateau of Bogotá (nearly 9000 feet above sea-level) to the Magdalena at Honda (8000 feet lower) in three days in fine weather, but to march a force even of 2000 men is quite another matter. Even the journey to and from Tunja and Bogotá is not the plain sailing it looks on a small scale map.

In saying that Santa Marta was the last Spanish stronghold in the north of Colombia, it must be remembered that, besides the fortress, the royalists still held the province of that name down to Ocaña, which they had just recovered from the republicans. Bolivar now once more drove them from it with heavy loss. Thence he proceeded to Mompox, which was commanded by his friends, the brothers Pinères.

All was going well when Bolivar found that Castillo, too wary a bird to be taken with the bait of honourable exile at Bogotá, had refused his appointment to the Council of War there. It is certain that he had established himself as the principal power in Cartagena, the governor, Juan de Dios Amador, was his ally, and, though to some extent unpopular owing to his arbitrary conduct, Castillo had a large following, and held all the military power of the fortress.

Beyond this it is difficult to unravel the tangled skein of Cartagenian politics, and the result would be of little interest to European readers. According to Bolivar's admirers, his sole object was to get the arms and supplies necessary to enable him to conquer Santa Marta. On the other hand, enemies of Bolivar, and partisans of Castillo, like Ducoudray-Holstein, aver that Bolivar was well supplied; that Santa Marta, hating Montalvo, the

Spanish Viceroy, was ready to rise; and that Montalvo himself had a French ship lying in the harbour ready to take him off at a moment's notice. Under these circumstances Ducoudray-Holstein says that Bolivar had only to march on Santa Marta to ensure the surrender of the fortress. He affirms that the destruction of Castillo was Bolivar's real object, and that in this he was supported by the Pinères, who, during his former stay at Cartagena, had intrigued with him against Torices (the then dictator) and Castillo, but had failed, and been banished.

The fact that the old enmity of 1813 between the two men was still as vigorous as ever is perhaps sufficient for our purpose. Castillo, determined not to have Bolivar at Cartagena, issued orders to oppose his march. During Bolivar's stay at Mompox, negotiations for a settlement with Castillo were carried on through the medium of Marimon, an ecclesiastic sent for the purpose from Cartagena. Nothing came of them, and Bolivar descended the Magdalena to Barranca, whence he again opened negotiations. Finding that Castillo was trying to suborn his troops, he marched to Turbaco, in the hills, a few miles from Cartagena. Thence he sent another emissary, Tomas Montilla, whose brother Mariano happened at the time to be military commandant of the fortress. He was not received at all, and some of Bolivar's friends in Cartagena were imprisoned when they demanded passports to go to him.

Thus the relations between the two leaders grew worse and worse, until Bolivar finally decided to appear before Cartagena with his troops. On the 27th March 1815 he seized the hill of La Popa, an elevation within cannon shot, even in those days, of the fortress. It rises some 500 feet above the plain, and commands, from the monastery on its summit, the whole town and the fort of San Felipe (or San Lazaro), from which Admiral Vernon's attack was so disastrously beaten off in 1741. La Popa

had a very deep well as its only source of water supply, and so bitter were the feelings against Bolivar in Cartagena that the garrison, unable to hold the hill themselves, poisoned the well by throwing rotten hides into it. That Bolivar should dare to sit down to blockade what was considered the strongest fortress on the north coast of South America, with a large garrison in it, certainly seems to show that his complaints of want of means to attack a place in the precarious state of Santa Marta were not founded. The only thing in favour of the story is Ducoudray-Holstein's statement that Bolivar had only one small gun to mount on La Popa. From the Popa there were more negotiations with Marimon, into the details of which it is useless to enter. They dragged on without result till the 22nd April, when Marimon wrote that General Morillo, with a large army from Europe, was already in Venezuela. About this time, too, Montalvo, the Spanish Viceroy[1] at Santa Marta, sent offers to the Cartagenians of assistance against Bolivar. These they had the decency to refuse. Even the bitterness of civil war was not sufficient to induce one party to call in the common enemy to help in the destruction of the other.

By the 29th April, the Spaniards had reconquered the Magdalena from Mompox to its mouth, and Bolivar was cut off from communication with Bogotá.

Then, at last, he gave way. Assembling a council of war, he explained that his own departure was an absolute necessity, if the situation was to be saved at all. The council agreed to this, provided they themselves, and any other officers who so desired, should be allowed to resign and leave the country.

On the 7th May, Marimon was informed of the decision. On the 8th, Bolivar embarked on the British brigantine "Discovery," sailing next day for Jamaica. Before sailing,

[1] In 1813 the Spanish Government had united New Granada and Venezuela under a single Viceroy, Marshal Montalvo (Pilling, 353).

Bolivar addressed his soldiers, explaining his motives. Advising his Venezuelans to go home, and his Granadian soldiers to conquer for their country, he laments the fate which compels him to resign the command, in order to save the army from destruction. He writes in a tone of deep despondency, saying that he is fated to have to leave his country and to die in inaction abroad. His own existence, he said, and that of the army being incompatible, he had preferred the army.[1]

Of Bolivar's conduct in the whole of this affair and of his final departure what shall we say?

Ducoudray-Holstein, as usual, has nothing but blame for him; Larrazabal nothing but praise. These are the extremes. To us, looking at the whole matter from an impartial standpoint, it seems impossible to exonerate either Bolivar or Castillo. The quarrel between them seems to have been based, on both sides, mainly on personal considerations. Neither of them thought fit to yield, or even to compromise, in a personal quarrel which was incompatible with the interests of the cause which both professed to serve. It was perfectly well known that Spain was about to make a desperate effort to retrieve her lost position in the colonies, and true patriots would have hastened to sink their differences in favour of a united effort against the common enemy. Neither of them would do so, and, at the last moment, one of them was compelled to depart if he was not to be destroyed, and that one must be Bolivar, who, otherwise, would have found himself between the upper millstone of the Spanish forces from the Magdalena, and the nether of Cartagena itself.

Had Bolivar and Castillo united for an active defence of Cartagena, it is by no means improbable that Morillo's army might have been destroyed, perhaps even before it ever sat down before the place. The remarks made by

[1] O'Leary, Docts., 15, p. 14.

Bolivar in his manifesto of 1812[1] anent the destructive effects of disunion might well be quoted against himself.

No sooner was Ferdinand VII. back on his throne at Madrid, on the 13th May 1814, than he began to think of measures for the suppression of the revolted American colonies. That was an idea which was always uppermost with every Spanish Government, were it Junta, Regency, Cortes, or the King himself. We must except the late Government of Joseph Bonaparte, for he knew well that he had quite enough to do at home, and that the naval supremacy of England forbade to him, though it allowed to a Spanish Government, any idea of an over-sea expedition.

The expedition now equipped by Ferdinand was the largest and most complete which Spain had been able to send. It consisted of 6 regiments of infantry, 2 of cavalry, and 18 guns, altogether 10,642 men, fully equipped in every way, including a siege train. The naval squadron, which carried and convoyed it, included 1 line of battleship of 74 guns, 3 frigates, 40 smaller ships of war, and 60 or 70 transports. To the chief command was appointed Don Pablo Morillo, who sailed, in the middle of February 1815, from Cadiz, as if for Buenos Aires, carrying sealed orders, to be opened off the Canary Islands. They were found to direct the fleet to Venezuela, which colony Morillo was to reduce to order. Having done that, he was to reconquer New Granada, then to march south, and, joined by the Quito royalists, under Montes, to carry the triumphant banners of Spain to Peru, and finally to Buenos Aires. Truly an immense and, as it turned out, impossible task.

On the 3rd April 1815, the fleet reached Puerto Santo, near Carúpano. Morillo decided that the first thing to be done was to subdue the island of Margarita,

[1] *Supra*, p. 81.

whose warlike inhabitants had kept the flag of liberty flying when it had been beaten to the ground on the mainland. At Carúpano Morillo found Morales, now master of the eastern provinces, in command of 5000 men, ready to proceed to Margarita. When the expedition landed there, the islanders saw that it was too strong to be resisted, and Arismendi, who commanded there for the republicans, submitted, with practically the whole of the island. Not so Bermudez, who succeeded in sailing with a single ship through the midst of the Spanish fleet, and, making a long circuit by Martinique and St Thomas, eventually arrived safely at Cartagena.

Morillo himself landed at Asuncion in Margarita on the 9th April. That general, like so many of the Spanish commanders in South America, was of humble origin. Originally a sergeant of marines, he had served on shore under Wellington, and quickly risen to the rank of brigadier-general, which he held when Ferdinand returned to Spain. He was one of the first to salute the restored monarch, which fact is said to have gained him his appointment, one beyond his very mediocre talents. His second in command and chief of the staff was Don Pascual Enrile, a Cuban of good family, whom Morillo called the "terror of evil doers," but of whom Boves had said that he "exceeded in barbarity and cruelty." The latter character was truly remarkable, looking to the source from which it came.

Leaving garrisons in Margarita and Cumaná, Morillo left for Caracas, where he arrived on the 11th May, and took over charge of the office of Captain-General from Cajigal, who became commander of the army. One of Morillo's first operations was to raise a forced loan of 200,000 "pesos," to replace the military chest which had been lost by the burning of the "San Pedro." In Caracas, he and his men acted in a very overbearing fashion. Many leading creoles were arrested, private

property was confiscated, the inhabitants were treated with entire lack of consideration in billeting soldiers on them, and cattle were taken without payment for the expedition to Cartagena. On the 17th May, Morillo issued a proclamation, informing the Granadians that he would soon be in their midst with an avenging army.

On the 1st June, the expedition left Caracas, consisting of 8500 men, led by Morillo and Enrile, and accompanied by two Inquisitors, who were to reopen the Holy Office at Cartagena.

The fleet of 56 ships, sailing from Puerto Cabello on the 12th July, reached Santa Marta on the 23rd and 24th. Morillo despatched thence two columns to operate by land. The first was to clear the lower Magdalena, to reinforce Mompox, and to occupy Ocaña on the east bank, and the province of Antioquia on the west. The second, under Morales, was the vanguard of the force for the siege of Cartagena. By the 15th August, Morales, after marching through a devastated country, crossed the Magdalena above Soledad and advanced on Turbaco, sweeping in all the resources in grain and cattle of the country to the south of Cartagena. Morillo, leaving Santa Marta on the 17th August, landed unopposed with the main body not far from the fortress on the 22nd and 23rd.

The blockade was established on the 1st September 1815. Cartagena was ill prepared for a siege, and the inhabitants of the surrounding country, after the disgraceful exhibition of civil war which they had recently witnessed, were inclined to help rather than to resist Morillo. Even those within the fortress were not all hostile to the Spaniard, seeing that the success of the independents apparently only meant civil war. Provisions were by no means sufficient for the maintenance of the large non-combatant population. For the sufferings from hunger, which soon began to be felt, Castillo

was blamed, and, on the 17th October, he was deposed from the command, Bermudez being elected by the garrison in his place.

Morillo's troops, however, were also suffering severely. Disease spread rapidly amongst the European troops, unseasoned to the trying climate of the neighbourhood, and they suffered constant loss in the frequent skirmishes which occurred. The defence was carried on with equal vigour by the gunboats in the outer harbour, and it was only after suffering considerable loss that the Spanish warships succeeded in entering it.

By November the famine in the fortress was intense. All ordinary food had run out, and the wretched people were living on limited rations of horse-flesh, dogs, cats, and rats. A certain amount of food was procured by fishing in the harbour along the shore of the Tierra Bomba, the island lying between the obstructed channel of the Boca Grande and the forts of Boca Chica commanding the open entrance of the harbour, seven or eight miles south of the city.[1] This source of supply Morillo determined to cut off by occupying Tierra Bomba. In order to divert attention, he proposed to attack the hill of La Popa, half a mile inland from the harbour. In Bolivar's siege this height had been held by the besieger, though, as he had practically no artillery, he could do little or no harm from it to the fortress. Against Morillo's artillery it was absolutely necessary for the garrison to hold La Popa, from the top of which the whole fortress was commanded.

[1] Cartagena stands practically on an island, connected with the mainland only by a narrow strip of land on the east. About two miles south of the city is the Boca Grande, the best entrance in old times to the splendid harbour. This entrance was blocked up with sunken ships in order to prevent the entrance of the buccaneers and other invaders, who, after that, had to go down another six miles to the narrow Boca Chica, and then beat up the harbour against the North-East Trades—no easy matter. The piece of low land between the Boca Grande and the Boca Chica is the Tierra Bomba.

On the 9th November, two deserters brought to Morillo the fullest information as to the defences of La Popa, and the attack was fixed for the night of the 10th. In the darkness the stormers arrived unperceived within 200 paces of the ditch of the defenders' works on the summit. Then a sentry gave the alarm. Though the surprise had failed, the Spanish column pushed bravely on up the steep hill; two men had actually reached the ditch when, the commander being shot down, the rest retired in disorder, after losing a third of their number. At the same time, an attack by the Spanish gunboats on those of the defenders in the bay had been repulsed.

Another attack was driven off on the 12th, and the besiegers' gunboats were compelled to run close into the shore to seek protection from their infantry. On the 13th, Morales succeeded in landing on Tierra Bomba, which stopped the fishing. He was master of the outer harbour, but was repulsed in an attempt to storm the now isolated forts of Boca Chica.[1]

By the end of November, the sufferings of the inhabitants were so fearful that the civil population were urged to leave the fortress. A few hundreds, mostly women and children, got out, only to die for the most part of starvation.

The garrison, reduced almost to a shadow, looked in vain for a ship bringing relief. Sentries actually died of starvation on their posts; resistance was no longer possible. Morillo's men, the Europeans at least, were almost as badly off, owing to the ravages of disease, and the general called on the governor to surrender, throwing himself and his men on the mercy of the king. Other-

[1] These forts still stand on either side of the narrow channel. As one passes in a steamer through the Boca Chica, it seems almost possible to throw a stone into either. They are now useless. During the siege they were commanded by Ducoudray-Holstein.

wise, Morillo threatened to send back the starving wretches whose misery alone had induced him to forgo his right to prevent their exit.

But the governor, though determined not to surrender, now realised that further resistance was hopeless, and was preparing to evacuate the place by sea. On the 5th December, the guns were spiked as well as was possible, and the garrison, with about 2000 of the inhabitants, assembled on the edge of the harbour ready to embark. The last post to be abandoned was La Popa.

To carry this multitude there were but sixteen small ships, badly provisioned, and ill equipped for sea. Under cover of night the flotilla succeeded in running the gauntlet of the fire of the enemy's gunboats and shore batteries, and reached without very heavy loss the Boca Chica, where they anchored in safety under protection of the guns of the forts. Having taken in a supply of water and embarked the garrisons of the forts, the ships sailed the same night.

Morillo, becoming aware of the evacuation on the 6th December, entered the fortress. In his official account of what he saw he writes—"The city presented the most horrible spectacle, the streets were strewn with unburied corpses, which polluted the air, and the greater part of the inhabitants were actually dying of hunger." O'Leary states that Morillo and his men behaved with the greatest humanity to these starving creatures. The soldiers divided their own rations with them, whilst Morillo took all possible measures to relieve their sufferings. Not so Morales and his troops, mostly Venezuelans, who freely indulged their lust for blood by indiscriminate massacres. That commander, on occupying the Boca Chica forts, found in them three officers and sixty soldiers who had been unable to embark with the other fugitives. Every one of them was brutally murdered.

Next day the inhabitants of the village of Boca Chica, who had concealed themselves in the scrub on Tierra Bomba, were induced by promises of safety to leave their hiding places. As soon as they returned, 300 or more of them were put to death. As usual, there had been atrocities on both sides, for O'Leary describes the murder, just before the siege, of some Spanish prisoners captured by republican privateers and brought to Cartagena.[1]

Morillo, too, took toll in a more deliberate way of the patriot leaders who fell into his hands. Among those who were shot or hanged was Bolivar's enemy Castillo, the ex-governor of Cartagena.[2]

Here it will be convenient to narrate briefly the remaining movements of Morillo in subjugating New Granada.

As soon as he had occupied Cartagena, he sent Colonel La Torre southwards with a strong column. He was to be joined on the way by Calzada, already arrived in New Granada from Barinas.

Meanwhile, in Bogotá things had not been going smoothly. There had been two reactionary plots, in one of which it had been sought to implicate Torices (formerly of Cartagena). He was honourably acquitted. The people, generally alarmed at the impending danger

[1] O'Leary, i. 287.

[2] Close to the present railway station, on the outskirts of Cartagena, may be seen a double row of columns, each with a bust on the top. If the author's memory serves him rightly, he counted sixteen. Under each bust is the name of the patriot, followed by the words "ahorcado en 1816" (hanged in 1816), or else "fusilado por la espalda" (shot in the back). A list is given by Larrazabal and others of the names of patriots executed in different parts of New Granada in 1816, with their rank and place of execution. There are 125 in all, of whom the most notable are Castillo (shot at Cartagena), J. Camacho (Bogotá), Torices (President—shot and body hung on gallows at Bogotá), Camilo Torres (the same as last), F. Caldas (Bogotá), J. R. Leiva (Spaniard, at Bogotá), and Montúfar. The last-named will be remembered as originally a Spanish envoy, and then a revolutionary leader in Quito.

when Cartagena should fall, would give little assistance to the government's schemes for resistance. The Congress was busy talking of reforms, whilst the Spaniards were losing no time in following up their success at Cartagena.

Calzada, after suffering a slight check, had defeated Urdaneta at Chitagá, in the province of Trujillo, on the 30th November 1815. He had occupied Cúcuta and Pamplona, and presently moved towards Ocaña to meet La Torre. On the Paramo of Cachirí he attacked 3000 republicans, mostly recruits, on the 21st February 1816. Thanks largely to the "Numancia" battalion of Venezuelans, Calzada gained, in the second day's battle, a complete victory, which was followed by the usual massacres. One Spanish colonel is said to have boasted that he had, with his own hand, killed so many rebels that his right arm was useless for several days. The force destroyed at Cachirí was practically all the Bogotá government had to oppose to the Spanish advance. Had Calzada advanced at once, he could have conquered Bogotá there and then. But he had to wait for La Torre.

Meanwhile, Warleta, with another column sent by Morillo, had, by the middle of March, subjugated the whole of Antioquia and Chocó,[1] though he encountered serious resistance from the manly population of the former. In Bogotá, J. F. Madrid now succeeded Torres as President. He found himself with very little influence in the panic-stricken capital, and was abandoned by the troops under Serviez, who, with many of the country people, sought safety on the plains of Casanare. Madrid then retired with his personal guard to Popayan, leaving Bogotá to its fate.

On the 5th May, La Torre was in Bogotá. A few

[1] The western district of the Western Cordilleras down to the Pacific Ocean.

days earlier he had issued promises of amnesty to all who should submit and swear fidelity to Ferdinand VII. When Morillo arrived, on the 26th May, he disallowed the amnesty. Those leaders who had remained at home on the strength of it were arrested, tried by court-martial, and hanged or shot. Amongst them, as already noted,[1] were Torres, Torices, Camacho, Montúfar, and others, including Caldas, a well-known scientist.

Morillo stayed at Bogotá till November 1816, when events in Venezuela, to be presently recounted, recalled him to that province. He left in command of 3800 men at Bogotá General Sámano, whom he later appointed Viceroy of New Granada, in place of Montalvo, whose methods were, he thought, too mild. Sámano was a real savage, who deluged Bogotá in blood.[2] His troops were principally Venezuelans and Pastusos.

[1] *Supra*, p. 164, *n.*

[2] Amongst Sámano's victims was a girl named Polycarpa Salabarrieta. Her lover, a republican like herself, had been compelled to serve in the Spanish ranks. It is not denied that the girl plotted the desertion of her lover and others, and prepared supplies for their flight to join the republican bands in Casanare. They were arrested, and Polycarpa's letters, found on the lover, implicated her. The two lovers, with six companions, were shot in the back at Bogotá on the 17th November 1817. Just before her death, the girl exclaimed, "My blood will very soon be avenged by the liberators of my country" This horrible case has attained the greatest celebrity in Colombia, where the story of the martyred heroine is a prime favourite of poets.